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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Origins of ASCAP
The American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (AS-
CAP) traces its origins back 70 years to a Times Square restaurant
named Shanley's Cafe. According to legend, composer Victor Herbert
walked into Shanley's one autumn evening in 1913 and heard a band
playing music from his then-current musical "Sweethearts."' Though
copyright owners had had the exclusive right to publicly perform their
music for profit since 1897,2 Shanley's never sought, much less paid for,
i. Allen, The Battle of Tin Pan Alley, 181 Harper's Mag. 514, 516 (1940).
2. Act of Jan. 6, 1897, ch. 4, 29 Stat. 481 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 106(4)).
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Herbert's permission to perform his works. A usually genial fellow,
Herbert's Irish temper boiled over. "My God!" he reportedly said. "If
they'll do this to my stuff when I can afford expensive lawyers, what
aren't they doing to the others? We've got to look after the b'ys."3
Herbert immediately realized that in order to "look after the b'ys,"
songwriters would have to be organized; and he and his lawyer, Nathan
Burkan, did so. ASCAP's first official meeting took place in March of
1914 in a New York City restaurant named Luchow's. Those in attend-
ance dedicated the infant organization to the prevention of unauthor-
ized performances of copyrighted music - and the first case they
supported was Victor Herbert's own against Shanley's Cafe.4 Herbert
won. In 1917, the United States Supreme Court rejected Shanley's con-
tention that because he did not charge for admission, and because the
music played in his cafe was "only incidental" to his restaurant busi-
ness, Herbert's music had not been performed "for profit." In a deci-
sion by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, the Court ruled that music
performed in restaurants is performed "for profit," even if money is not
taken at the door and the music is not charged for separately from the
food and drink.'
With this important victory under its belt, ASCAP proceeded to
fulfill its charter by bringing scores of infringement suits against those
who failed to heed its warnings. ASCAP won all of those cases, but it
also learned the first economic reality of copyright enforcement: in-
fringement suits frequently do not pay their own way. Until 1921, AS-
CAP's expenses exceeded its collections even though its officers worked
for free. Indeed, Victor Herbert may have thought that he had "expen-
sive lawyers," but Nathan Burkan himself did not charge ASCAP for
his legal services during those early years.6
ASCAP's enforcement activities have never been criticized. The
Justice Department and the courts always have recognized that it
would be impossible for individual composers and music publishers to
police the public performance of their works.7 Thus, in this regard,
3. 5,000,000 Songs, 7 Fortune Mag. 27, 28 (1933).
4. Id.; Allen, supra note 1, at 516.
5. Herbert v. Shanley Co., 242 U.S. 591, 594-95 (1917).
6. 5,000,000 Songs, supra note 3, at 29; Allen, supra note 1, at 516.
7. See, for example, the Complaint filed by the Justice Department in United States
(US) v. ASCAP, quoted in Finkelstein, The Composer and the Public Interest - Regulation
of Performing Rights Societies, 19 Law & Contemp. Prob. 275, 284 (1954) the Amicus Cu-
riae Brief of the Solicitor General to the Supreme Court in K-91, Inc. v. Gershwin Publish-
ing Corp., 372 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1045 (1968), quoted in Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc. (CBS) v. ASCAP, 337 F. Supp. 394, 398 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Alden-
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there seems to be a consensus that ASCAP performs an essential
service.
ASCAP did not confine itself to anti-infringement activities, how-
ever. It also set itself up as a copyright "clearinghouse." On behalf of
its members, ASCAP issued licenses to all who wished to perform their
music. In those early days, music users were generally theaters, dance
halls, taverns and hotels-the sorts of users that were unlikely to know
in advance precisely which tunes they would be playing. As a result,
ASCAP conceived and issued a license that authorized each user to
perform any or all of the compositions in the ASCAP repertory, as
many or as few times as the user chose, in exchange for a single, annual
license fee. This form of license was and still is known as a "blanket
license."'
B. Blanket Licenses
1. Early Blanket Licenses
The wisdom of ASCAP's "clearinghouse" also has been acknowl-
edged. It was, at least in the beginning, essential, because when AS-
CAP was formed, "those who performed copyrighted music for profit
were so numerous and widespread, and most performances so fleeting,
that as a practical matter it was impossible for the many individual
copyright owners to negotiate with and license the users. . . ."' Like-
wise, "[o]n the other side of the coin, those who wished to perform
compositions without infringing the copyright were, as a practical mat-
ter, unable to obtain licenses from the owners of the works.they wished
to perform."'"
Although the central clearinghouse nature of ASCAP's licensing
activities has never been questioned, certain features of its early blan-
ket licenses were. In order to permit ASCAP to function "most effec-
tively," its members assigned to ASCAP the nondramatic performing
rights to their music. In the beginning-and for many years-these as-
signments were exclusive. This meant that anyone wanting a license
for those rights had to obtain it from ASCAP alone. Not even a song's
own composer or publisher could issue a performance license. In addi-
tion, for many years, ASCAP's blanket licenses were available on an
Rochelle, Inc. v. ASCAP, 80 F. Supp. 888, 891 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), relief, 80 F. Supp. 900
(S.D.N.Y. 1948); and Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI) v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 5 (1979).
8. CBS v. ASCAP, 400 F. Supp. 737, 741-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
9. BMI v. CBS, supra note 7, at 4-5.
10. CBS v. ASCAP, supra note 8, at 741.
11. Alden-Rochelle, Inc. v. ASCAP, supra note 7, at 891.
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annual basis only; ASCAP would license nothing less. 2
Prior to the advent of radio, these restrictive features of the blan-
ket license were of little if any practical consequence. By the 1930s
however, relations between ASCAP and the radio industry had soured.
The issue was money, and the dispute focused on the amount radio
stations had to pay for performance licenses. Since ASCAP controlled
the rights to some 80% of the music radio broadcast, the specter of al-
leged antitrust violations appeared-and has remained to haunt AS-
CAP ever since.
In 1934, the Department of Justice filed suit against ASCAP alleg-
ing that it dominated the radio industry. The case never came to a
head, however. After two weeks of trial in 1935, the Government
asked for an adjournment, and the case was never resumed.' 3 Perhaps
it was left dormant because in that year, ASCAP and the radio industry
signed a new five-year licensing agreement-one that called for a sub-
stantial increase in fees, but one that apparently satisfied radio never-
theless, for then. 4
When the time came for the ASCAP-radio industry agreement to
be renegotiated, ASCAP served notice that it intended to ask for still
higher fees. In response, in 1939, the radio industry organized its own
performing rights society, Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI).' 5 Though a
new agreement with ASCAP was reached, BMI survived and grew.
Today, BMI ranks beside ASCAP as one of the two most significant
music licensing organizations in this country and the world.' 6
In retrospect, it is apparent that what had upset radio in 1939 was
the size of the licensing fee ASCAP had proposed and not its methods
of operation nor even its blanket license. For when BMI went into
business in 1940, it too acquired exclusive licensing rights,'7 and it too
issued annual blanket licenses to the very radio stations that were its
owners. '
8
BMI was less than two years old when in 1941 the Justice Depart-
ment sued it along with ASCAP alleging that the blanket licenses used
by both illegally restrained trade in violation of the antitrust laws.
12. CBS v. ASCAP, 562 F.2d 130, 133 (2d Cir. 1977); Cirace, CBS v. ASCAP" An Eco-
nomicAnalysis ofa Poliical Problem, 47 Fordham L. Rev. 277, 278 n.16 (1978).
13. CBS v. ASCAP, supra note 12, at 133.
14. Cirace, supra note 12, at 287.
15. Id. at 288; CBS v. ASCAP, supra note 8, at 742; Allen, supra note I, at 514-15.
16. BMI v. Moor-Law, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 758, 760 (D. Del. 1981), aff'd wKihoutpubished
opinion, 691 F.2d 490 (3d Cir. 1982).
17. US v. BMI, 1940-1943 Trade Cas. 56,096 at 382 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
18. CBS v. ASCAP, supra note 8, at 742.
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Both organizations quickly agreed to Consent Decrees."
2. The Consent Decrees
The 1941 Consent Decrees prohibited ASCAP and BMI from ac-
quiring or asserting exclusive licensing rights.2' Thus, composers and
publishers were given the right to issue licenses themselves in competi-
tion with one another and with ASCAP and BMI. In addition, the
Decrees required both organizations to offer "per program" licenses as
well as annual licenses to broadcasters, and per program and per com-
position licenses to nonbroadcasters.2' (Per program licenses authorize
music users to perform any or all of the compositions in the ASCAP
and BMI repertories in exchange for a fee based on revenues earned by
the particular program in which a song is used. Thus a per program
license is a form of "blanket license."22 On the other hand, per compo-
sition licenses, which are sometimes referred to as "per use" licenses,
are not blanket licenses; they authorize the use of a particular, identi-
fied composition only. 23)
Both Consent Decrees have been amended: ASCAP's in 195024
and BMI's in 1966.25 And both organizations continue to operate to-
day under the terms of those amended decrees.26
3. Current Blanket Licenses
Today, ASCAP and BMI issue licenses to a wide variety of music
users. In addition to radio and television stations and networks,
licenses are issued to such businesses as concert halls, hotels, retail
stores, colleges, dance studios, bars, nightclubs and restaurants. The
precise form of the license issued depends on the nature of the music
user's business, though within each industry the license is uniform.27
Some license fees are very modest. For example, BMI's license fee
for bars, nightclubs and restaurants that use live music is based on the
amount of money the licensee spends each year hiring musicians.
19. US v. BMI, supra note 17; US v. ASCAP, 1940-1943 Trade Cas. 56,104 (S.D.N.Y.
1941).
20. US v. BMI, supra note 17, at 382; US v. ASCAP, supra note 19, at 403.
21. US v. BMI, supra note 17, at 383; US v. ASCAP, supra note 19, at 404.
22. CBS v. ASCAP, supra note 7, at 396; CBS v. ASCAP, supra note 12, at 133; BMI v.
CBS, supra note 7, at 27 n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
23. See, e.g., US v. BMI, supra note 17, at 383; and CBS v. ASCAP, supra note 12, at 134
n.9.
24. US v. ASCAP, 1950 Trade Cas. 62,595 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
25. US v. BMI, 1966 Trade Cas. 71,941 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
26. BMI v. CBS, supra note 7, at 11, 12 n.20.
27. BMI v. Moor-Law, Inc., supra note 16, at 760.
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Those who spend less than $5,000 a year for musicians are charged
only $75 for an annual BMI license, while those who spend $450,000 or
more are charged $1,700. Most music users need an ASCAP license as
well. ASCAP's license fee formula includes the price of drinks served,
seating capacity and other variables. And ASCAP's fee is generally
somewhat more expensive, because the ASCAP repertory is substan-
tially larger than BMI's.28
BMI's concert hall license fee is based on concert revenues. Its
radio license fee is geared to advertising revenues. 29 For many years,
its network television license fee was based on net receipts from pro-
gram sponsors,30 and its individual television station license was based
on station revenues.
3'
However, neither BMI's nor ASCAP's license fees vary according
to the quality, quantity or popularity of the music actually performed.
3 2
This clearly has been the rub for those who object to blanket licensing.
C. Post-Consent Decree Challenges to Blanket Licensing
Although the Consent Decrees imposed "tight restrictions"'33 on
ASCAP and BMI, several of their customers have remained dissatis-
fied. As a result, there have been several cases in which music users
have alleged that despite ASCAP's and BMI's compliance with the
terms of the Decrees, blanket licensing continues to viola, the antitrust
laws.
In K-91, Inc. v. Gershwin Publishing Corp. ,3' decided in 1967, a
radio station asserted that ASCAP and its members had conspired to
fix prices and monopolize trade in violation of the Sherman Act. The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed. It noted that ever since the
1950 amendment to the ASCAP Consent Decree, individual composers
and publishers have had the right to issue individual licenses for the
performance of their own songs. Because ASCAP's licensing authority
is not exclusive, the court ruled that ASCAP's offer of a blanket license
did not violate the antitrust laws. The court also noted that if the radio
station wanted a blanket license but was dissatisfied with the fee de-
manded by ASCAP, the station had the right, under the Consent De-
28. Id. at 760-61.
29. Id. at 761.
30. CBS v. ASCAP, supra note 8, at 743.
31. Buffalo Broadcasting Company, Inc. v. ASCAP, 546 F. Supp. 274, 282 (S.D.N.Y.
1982), appealpending.
32. BMI v. CBS, supra note 7, at 31 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
33. Id. at 11.
34. 372 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1045 (1968).
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cree, to apply to the Federal District Court in New York City to fix a
reasonable fee. For this reason, the court explained, "ASCAP cannot
be accused of fixing prices because . . . it is not the price fixing
authority.
35
In 1979, in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Grant's Cabin, Inc. ,36 a night-
club owner alleged that BMI and its affiliates combined and conspired
to fix prices. A Federal District Court in Missouri ruled otherwise.
Citing K-91, Inc. v. Gershwin, the court held that BMI's blanket license
does not violate the antitrust laws because individual licenses are avail-
able from composers and publishers. Furthermore, the court said that
blanket licenses issued by ASCAP and BMI "are justifiable as a market
necessity for . . . licensing . . . restaurants, night clubs, skating rinks
and radio shows," and because they are a market necessity for this pur-
pose, they do "not violate the antitrust laws."37
In 1981, in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Moor-Law, Inc. ,38 another
nightclub owner alleged that BMI's use of blanket licenses restrained
and monopolized trade in violation of the antitrust laws. A Federal
District Court in Delaware ruled to the contrary in a lengthy decision
which gave careful consideration to economic principles as well as
purely legal doctrine.
In 1982, in FEL. Publications, Ltd v. Catholic Bishop of Chi-
cago,"9 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the blanket li-
cense issued by a religious music publisher to Chicago's Catholic
parishes does not violate the antitrust laws.
Finally, in CBS v. ASCAP, ° the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
held that the blanket licenses ASCAP and BMI issue to the CBS net-
work do not restrain trade, because the network has a fully available
alternative: it can obtain performance licenses directly from the com-
posers and publishers of the music it wishes to broadcast. The Second
Circuit so ruled on remand from the United States Supreme Court
which earlier had held that blanket licensing of television networks is
not illegal per se even though "the necessity for and advantages of a
blanket license for those users may be far less obvious than is the case
35. Id. at 4.
36. 1978-1981 CCH Copyright Law Decisions 25,074, 204 USPQ 633 (E.D. Mo. 1979).
37. 1978-1981 CCH Copyright Law Decisions at 15,447; 204 USPQ at 634.
38. 527 F. Supp. 758 (D. Del. 1981), q'd withoutpublished opinion, 691 F.2d 490 (3d Cir.
1982).
39. CCH Copyright Law Reports 25,376 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 74 L.Ed.2d 113
(1982).
40. 620 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 970 (1981).
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when potential users are individual television . . . stations."41
Given this string of cases in which the legality of blanket licensing
has been upheld in a wide variety of settings and circumstances, and
given the Supreme Court's observation in the CBS case that "the ne-
cessity for and advantages of a blanket license for [television networks]
may be far less obvious than is the case when the potential users are
individual television . . . stations," ASCAP and BMI were no doubt
shocked when in August of 1982, a Federal District Court in New York
City ruled that they did violate the antitrust laws when they issued
blanket licenses to individual, local television stations - something
ASCAP and BMI have been doing, under and pursuant to the Consent
Decrees, for more than 40 years. The case in which this remarkable
decision was rendered is Buffalo Broadcasting v. ASCAP.
4 2
The thesis of this article is that Buffalo Broadcasting was wrongly
decided, and that it was wrongly decided for two reasons: first, because
the court used economic theory, rather than legal doctrine, to decide
the case; and second, because the court erred in its use of that economic
theory. Had the court used economic theory properly, it would have
concluded that blanket licensing is perfectly consistent with the anti-
trust laws. Alternatively, had the court simply applied stare decisis and
ruled on the basis of legal doctrine, it would have held in favor of AS-
CAP and BMI as well.
It is the further thesis of.this article that the economics of blanket
licensing are such that blanket licensing should be permissible under
the antitrust laws even if the alternative of obtaining licenses directly
from individual composers and publishers were not available as a prac-
tical matter.
In order to develop these theses, it is necessary to begin with a
description of the process by which music is licensed for television
broadcast and some background on television broadcasters' dissatisfac-
tion with blanket licensing.
II. LICENSING Music FOR TELEVISION BROADCAST
A. Uses of Music in Television Programs
Television programs use music in three ways. In some programs,
such as variety shows, music is the feature or main focus of viewer at-
tention. Other programs, including comedy and dramatic series, use
theme music to introduce and close the show, and background music to
41. BMI v. CBS, supra note 7, at 21.
42. 546 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), appealpending.
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complement on-screen action.4" Whether music is feature, theme or
background has no legal significance in itself; but it does indicate the
manner in which the music probably was obtained by the program's
producer.
Television producers obtain music in two ways. Theme and back-
ground music almost always is composed especially for particular pro-
grams by professional composers hired for that very purpose. Feature
music, on the other hand, usually is existing music that was composed
for some other principal purpose such as concert performances, record-
ings, motion pictures or musical plays."
Even the manner in which music is obtained by television produ-
cers has no legal significance in itself. It does, however, affect whether
broadcasters can function without blanket licenses from ASCAP and
BMI. To understand why, it is first necessary to understand the nature
of composers' rights under the Copyright Act.
B. Composers' Rights Under the Copyright 4ct
A copyright is a bundle of several separate and conceptually dis-
tinct rights.4" Two of these rights are necessary for the production and
broadcast of virtually all television programming: the right to record
music on program soundtracks, 6 and the right to publiclyperform mu-
sic for profit."
1. The Synchronization Right
The right to record music on a television program soundtrack is
known as the "synchronization right," because in recording the music
on the soundtrack, it is synchronized with the on-screen action.48 Pro-
ducers obtain "synch" rights directly from the owner of the copyright
to the music to be used. If the music already exists, the copyright usu-
ally is owned by a music publisher (which acquired it by assignment
from the composer); and the producer deals directly with the publisher
to obtain a synch license. Most synch rights transactions begin with a
43. CBS v. ASCAP, supra note 8, at 755.
44. Id. at 756.
45. 17 U.S.C. § 106; M. Witmark & Sons v. Jensen, 80 F. Supp. 843, 847 (D. Minn.
1948), appeal dismissed mem. sub nom. M. Witmark & Sons v. Berger Amusement Co., 177
F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1949).
46. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1); "live" performances which are never to be rerun (and certain
"one-run" taped programs which by industry custom are considered "live") do not require
recording licenses. CBS v. ASCAP, supra note 8, at 759.
47. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4).
48. CBS v. ASCAP, supra note 8, at 743, 759.
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telephone call from the producer (or its agent) to the Harry Fox
Agency, Inc., which represents some 3,500 music publishers including
almost all of the major publishers. The Fox Agency usually has fee
instructions from its publisher-clients, or is familiar with their fees from
prior transactions, and thus frequently is able to give producers license
fee quotes over the phone. The entire licensing transaction often takes
no longer than two or three days. In fact, the Fox Agency issues sev-
eral thousand synch licenses each year with a basic staff of only two
employees.49
If the music to be used is written especially for a television pro-
gram by a composer hired by the producer, the copyright to that music
belongs (at least initially) to the producer itself.5" For this reason, the
producer acquires the synch right to such music simply by hiring the
composer to write it.
2. The Performance Right
The right to broadcast music for profit is known as the "perform-
ance right.'" Until the Buffalo Broadcasting decision, performance
rights were obtained by broadcasters (not by producers).52 Since the
Consent Decrees were entered in 1950, broadcasters have had the right
to obtain performance licenses directly from copyright owners53 (which
are usually music publishers). Nevertheless, as a matter of historic fact,
broadcasters have obtained performance rights from ASCAP and BMI
which serve as the publishers' non-exclusive agents for issuing public
performance licenses.54
3. The "Splitting" of Synchronization and Performance Rights
In Buffalo Broadcasting, the court described the acquisition of
synch rights by producers and the acquisition of performance rights by
broadcasters as a "split."-5 It appears that the unstated implication of
the "splitting" accusation is that composers and music publishers have
managed to charge broadcasters twice for what really is a single com-
modity. In fact, it is not conceptually accurate to describe the method
49. Id. at 759-60.
50. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a), (b).
51. CBS v. ASCAP, supra note 8, at 743.
52. Id.
53. See footnote 20, supra, and accompanying text.
54. CBS v. ASCAP, supra note 8, at 743; Buffalo Broadcasting v. ASCAP, supra note 3 1,
at 281-82.
55. Buffalo Broadcasting v. ASCAP, supra note 31, at 283.
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by which music is licensed for television use as a "split." The reason
for the method is rooted in history and is conceptually proper.
When movies were silent, theaters employed pianists or orchestras
to provide musical accompaniment to the films being shown. Thus, in
those days, movie theaters themselves performed the music; and after
ASCAP brought a number of infringement suits, theater owners ob-
tained performance licenses from it. When "talkies" were introduced
in the late 1920s, movie producers recorded the sound, first on records
and then on soundtracks. Since some of that sound was music, movie
producers needed and obtained recording or synchronization licenses
from composers and publishers.56 Conceptually, this was correct, be-
cause producers recorded music but did not perform it, while movie
theaters performed music but did not record it. This same conceptual
logic applies in television today: producers record music on the sound-
tracks of their programs but do not themselves perform it, while televi-
sion stations and networks perform the music on those soundtracks by
broadcasting it but do not themselves record it.
Ironically, music licensing practices in the theatrical motion pic-
ture industry no longer conform to the conceptual logic of its earlier
days.
4. Music Licensing in the Motion Picture Industry
Motion picture theaters first began obtaining blanket licenses from
ASCAP in 1923 when movies were still silent, and the music performed
by theaters was played by pianists and orchestras. In 1934, after "talk-
ies" had become common, ASCAP negotiated a new form of blanket
license with trade organizations representing movie theater owners.
The license fee was based on seating capacity and was "very reason-
able."57 In 1947, however, ASCAP proposed a new formula--one
which would have increased movie theater license fees 200% to 1500%.
Naturally, theater owners protested and organized the Theater Owners
of America to represent them in collective bargaining with ASCAP.
58
In 1948, a new rate was agreed to, one that resulted in fee increases of
25% to 30%.59
Though the new rate was "fair and reasonable,"60 ASCAP's initial
proposal rekindled a long-dormant antitrust suit that had been filed
56. Alden-RocheUe, Inc. v. ASCAP, supra note 7, at 891-92.
57. Id. at 892.
58. Cirace, supra note 12, at 291.
59. Alden-Rochelle, Inc. v. ASCAP, supra note 7, at 895.
60. Id. at 896.
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against it by the owners of 200 theaters. Furthermore, in an unrelated
copyright infringement case filed by several ASCAP members against
theaters that did not have licenses, the theater owners asserted (as an
affirmative defense) alleged antitrust violations by ASCAP and its
members. These two cases changed the manner in which music per-
formance rights are licensed in the motion picture business.
Both cases held that ASCAP had acquired monopoly power over
the music necessary for the exhibition of movies, and that ASCAP and
its members had restrained trade by fixing the price charged for the
right to use that music. In the antitrust case, Alden-Rochelle v. AS-
CAP,6' a Federal District Court in New York City restrained ASCAP
from issuing performance licenses to movie theaters; and the court re-
strained ASCAP's members from refusing to grant performance
licenses to movie producers at the same time as synchronization rights
are granted. In the infringement case, M. Witmark & Sons v. Jensen ,62
a Federal District Court in Minnesota denied ASCAP's members any
recovery against the theaters they had sued, even though it was admit-
ted that those theaters had publicly performed music for profit without
a license to do so.
As a result of these two cases, theatrical motion picture producers
now obtain performance licenses from composers and publishers at the
same time synch rights are obtained. Producers then "pass along" to
movie theaters the right to perform the music that is recorded on mo-
tion picture soundtracks. (The performance right so obtained is only
the right to perform the music in motion picture theaters, however. It
does not include the right to perform that music on television. Thus, it
is still necessary for television networks and stations to have perform-
ance licenses, even when they broadcast movies originally produced for
theatrical exhibition.)63
The Alden-Rochelle and Witmark cases highlighted what some
considered to be a loophole in the 1941 Consent Decree. Although the
Decree prohibited ASCAP from acquiring the exclusive right to grant
performance licenses, the Decree did not prohibit ASCAP from requir-
ing its members to pool all of their licensing revenues, including those
revenues received by composers and publishers who licensed the per-
formance of their music themselves. In fact, ASCAP did require such
pooling; and as a result, ASCAP members had little, if any, incentive to
61. 80 F. Supp. 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), relief, 80 F. Supp. 900 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
62. 80 F. Supp. 843 (D. Minn. 1948), appeal dismissed mem. sub nom. M. Witmark &
Sons v. Berger Amusement Co., 177 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1949).
63. Buffalo Broadcasting v. ASCAP, supra note 31, at 284.
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grant performance licenses to producers.64
The 1950 amendment to the Consent Decree closed this loophole
by prohibiting ASCAP from requiring its members to pool fees they
receive from directly issuing their own performance licenses.65 In addi-
tion, the 1950 amendment also eliminated ASCAP's purported ability
to "fix" the prices charged to music users by providing that if a music
user is dissatisfied with the fee demanded by ASCAP, the user may
apply to the Federal District Court in New York City for an order de-
termining a "reasonable" fee.66
The 1950 amendment also incorporated the Alden-Rochelle order
prohibiting ASCAP from issuing performance licenses to movie thea-
ters. 67 However, given ASCAP's compliance with the 1950 amend-
ment's prohibition against pooling fees received from direct licenses,
and given the right that music users now have to apply for a court-
determined reasonable fee, it is doubtful that Alden-Rochelle or
Witmark would be decided again today the way they were in 1948. At
least it was doubtful until the decision in the Buffalo Broadcasting case.
Whether or not Alden-Rochelle and Witmark would be decided the
same today, it is historically significant that the advent of commercial
television roughly coincided with those two cases and the subsequent
amendment to the ASCAP Consent Decree. The reason it is significant
is that the television industry's dissatisfaction with blanket licensing
can be traced directly to ASCAP's refusal to apply the "'Alden-Rochelle
doctrine" to television broadcasting.
III. NETWORK DISSATISFACTION WITH BLANKET LICENSING
A. Early Network-ASCAP Negotiations
ASCAP issued its first blanket license to television in 1941 when
television was still in its infancy. Apparently, ASCAP did so to pro-
mote the growth of the television industry and to establish the prece-
dent that licenses were necessary, rather than to raise money, because
that first license was gratuitous. By 1948, however, ASCAP decided
that television, though still young, was old enough to pay something.
As a result, ASCAP canceled the 1941 license and served notice of its
intention to negotiate a license fee.68
64. CBS v. ASCAP, supra note 12, at 133.
65. US v. ASCAP, supra note 24, at 63,752.
66. Id. at 63,754.
67. Id. at 63,752.
68. Buffalo Broadcasting v. ASCAP, supra note 31, at 287.
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The negotiations were conducted on behalf of the television indus-
try principally by the networks. Aware of the decision in A/den-
Rochelle, the networks proposed that the doctrine of that case be ex-
tended to motion pictures broadcast on television. ASCAP refused to
apply the,4den-Rochelle rule to television, however. And in 1949, the
networks agreed to a blanket license that did not make any exception
for motion pictures whose theatrical performance rights had been li-
censed by producers directly from composers or publishers.6 9
B. Network Application for Limited License
The networks' blanket licenses were renewed every several years
on substantially the same terms. In 1970, however, network dissatisfac-
tion with ASCAP's blanket license percolated to the surface again.
NBC studied the music it had broadcast and concluded that it did not
need access to ASCAP's entire repertory. Rather, NBC determined
that it could make do with a license to broadcast 2,217 specific compo-
sitions and certain background music. As a result, it asked ASCAP for
a license for this music in particular; and when ASCAP declined, NBC
went to court.
70
It was NBC's position that ASCAP's refusal to license anything
less than its entire repertory was a violation of the antitrust laws. Nev-
ertheless, the proceeding filed by the network in 1970 was not an anti-
trust lawsuit. Rather, NBC filed an application under the 1950
Consent Decree for a judicial determination of a reasonable fee. In its
application, NBC alleged that properly interpreted, the Consent Decree
itself required ASCAP to grant the limited license NBC sought.
ASCAP of course disagreed. As it read the Consent Decree, it had
no obligation to issue limited licenses. Furthermore, ASCAP argued,
the license sought by NBC "would itself constitute an anti-trust viola-
tion because it would enable NBC, through its 200 affiliated stations, to
'pitch the might of the NBC television network' against unprotected
individual composers, who would have to knuckle under to NBC's
terms in order to have their songs performed on the air.""
The court declined the opportunity offered by both parties to an-
swer the underlying "question . . . of broad antitrust policy."72 In-
stead, the court limited its inquiry to whether the limited license sought
69. Id. at 287-88.
70. US v. ASCAP (Application of National Broadcasting Co., Inc.), 1971 Trade Cas.
73,491 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
71. Id. at 90,009.
72. Id.
19831
LOYOLA ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL
by NBC was required by the Consent Decree. And the court found
that it was not. The court construed the Consent Decree to permit lim-
ited licenses but not to require them. The provision authorizing the
court to fix a reasonable fee if the parties themselves could not agree
was merely a description of "how fees were to be set for licenses that
ASCAP was bound to grant, [and did] not. . . delineate ASCAP's ob-
ligations to grant them."73 The court also was influenced by the par-
ties' prior dealings with one another.
The consistent practice of NBC in licensing the entire ASCAP
repertory. . . for the twenty years since entry of the amended
judgment is indicative of the intent of the judgment and is
most persuasive that this is the correct interpretation of its
terms. Two decades of acquiescence in this interpretation of
the judgment is most relevant to a decision on this
application."4
Though not strictly necessary for its decision, the court also noted
that ASCAP had "persuasively" pointed out that "a limited license for
a bulk user of musical compositions, such as NBC, would be unwork-
able. Broadcasting live parades, sporting events and similar programs,
in which bands perform without prior censorship of their selections,
would make a license of some 2,200 of the tens of thousands of avail-
able musical works completely illusory.
75
NBC accepted the court's ruling. In the meantime, however, CBS
had initiated a legal attack of its own on blanket licensing - an attack
which would occupy the attention of the courts and the industry for the
next twelve years.
C. The CBS v. ASCAP Case
1. "The Break-Up of an Amicable Marriage"
76
CBS has held blanket licenses since 1929 when it obtained one
from ASCAP for a radio station. Though CBS may have desired an
Alden-Rochelle "carve-out" provision in 1949 when television blanket
license fees first were negotiated 77-a provision which it did not get-
"CBS appears to have lived quite happily with the blanket arrange-
ment" 78 until 1969. Ironically, CBS's legal attack on blanket licensing
73. Id. at 90,010.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. CBS v. ASCAP, supra note 8, at 753.
77. See footnote 69, supra, and accompanying text.
78. CBS v. ASCAP, supra note 8, at 753.
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was not triggered by ASCAP's refusal to issue an alternate form of li-
cense. Indeed, in 1969, CBS and ASCAP agreed on new blanket li-
cense fees. However the size of the new ASCAP fees "would have had
the effect of sharply widening the historical ratio between BMI and
ASCAP fees from CBS," and BMI responded by insisting on "main-
taining parity with ASCAP."79 When BMI and CBS were unable to
agree on new fees between them, BMI canceled its blanket license to
CBS as of January 1, 1970. Then, and only then, did CBS ask BMI and
ASCAP to state the terms on which they would issue licenses which
would provide for "payments measured by the actual use of [their] mu-
sic. "" ASCAP and BMI both responded by saying that they were will-
ing to discuss the matter. But CBS chose not to pursue it. Instead, on
December 31, 1969, it filed an antitrust suit against both organizations
in the Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York.
In its complaint, CBS alleged that the licensing practices used by
ASCAP and BMI-though consistent with the Consent Decrees--con-
stituted illegal price fixing, boycotting and tying in violation of the
Sherman Act.
2. The District Court Rulings
Early in the lawsuit, ASCAP made a motion for summary judg-
ment seeking dismissal of CBS's complaint. ASCAP's motion was
based on the contention that K-91, Inc. v. Gershwin Publishing Corp. 8
had rejected the very same antitrust claims then being made by CBS.
The court agreed that CBS's allegations were "substantially similar" to
those made in K-91, but it found that "one outstanding difference exists
between the two cases which compels a denial of ASCAP's motion. ' 2
The difference was that in K-91, no alternative to blanket licensing was
proposed. Indeed, in K-91, the parties had stipulated that it would be
"practicably and virtually impossible" 3 for radio stations to acquire, or
for composers and publishers to issue, separate licenses for each broad-
cast of a musical composition. CBS, on the other hand, did propose
what it considered to be a practical alternative to blanket licensing,
namely "per use" licensing. (CBS's proposal called for music users to
pay a lump sum for a "library card right" to use any song in the AS-
CAP and BMI repertories. In addition, the user would pay an addi-
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. 372 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1045 (1968).
82. CBS v. ASCAP, supra note 7, at 398.
83. Id. at 400.
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tional fee each time music covered by the "library card" actually was
broadcast, unless a license for such use were obtained directly from the
composer or publisher.) 4 Furthermore, in the context of network tele-
vision, the court doubted the practical value of CBS's right to deal di-
rectly with individual composers and publishers, saying that it was
inclined to believe that this right was "more apparent than real."85
This then made the feasibility of CBS's "per use" proposal a key ques-
tion in the case. Because there were genuine issues of material fact
concerning this question, CBS was entitled to prove its contentions at
trial; and this was the reason the court denied ASCAP's motion for
summary judgment.
Ironically, after an eight-week trial, the court did not reach the
issue of the feasibility of CBS's "per use" proposal. It did not, because
it found - contrary to its initial inclination - that the network's right
to deal directly with individual composers and publishers was real. In-
deed, it was so real that blanket licensing by ASCAP and BMI did not
restrain trade at all, because CBS simply was not compelled to take a
blanket license. Instead, CBS had a realistic alternative: it could have
obtained performance licenses for the music it wanted to use directly
from the more than "3,500 publishers and many thousands of compos-
ers who are eager for exposure of their music."86
The court found that the mechanics for such direct licensing would
not be as complex as CBS asserted. Program producers could obtain
network performance licenses in one of two ways, depending on the
nature of the music in question. The copyrights to music written espe-
cially for particular programs by composers-for-hire usually belong to
publishers owned or controlled by the producers themselves. Thus,
producers themselves frequently have the power to license the perform-
ance of that music. Although the copyrights to pre-existing music usu-
ally belong to unaffiliated publishers, producers must deal with them
(either directly or through agents) to obtain synchronization licenses;
and the court found that it would be possible for producers to obtain
performance licenses at the same time in the same transaction.
For this reason, the court rejected CBS's claims that ASCAP and
BMI were guilty of price fixing, tying, boycotting, or monopolization.
8 7
84. Id. at 397 n. 1.
85. Id. at 401.
86. CBS v. ASCAP, supra note 8, at 779.
87. Id. at 781-82.
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3. The First Court of Appeals Decision
CBS appealed, and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals re-
versed.88 The appellate court agreed that performance licenses could
be obtained directly from composers and publishers. But according to
the Court of Appeals' complex reasoning, the availability of such direct
licensing made blanket licensing illegal rather than legal. The appel-
late court explained that the availability of direct licensing saved blan-
ket licensing from being an illegal tie-in or block-booking. But a
majority of the appellate court said that the availability of direct licens-
ing did not resolve CBS's price-fixing charge. According to the major-
ity, blanket licensing results in "at least the threshold elimination of
price competition" for performance licenses; and the existence of blan-
ket licensing "dulls" the "incentive" of composers and publishers to
compete with one another by issuing their own individual performance
licenses.8 9
Though price-fixing is usually illegalper se, the Court of Appeals
concluded that it is not illegal where market circumstances are such
that some form of price-fixing "is absolutely necessary for the market
to function at all." 9 In this case, however, the District Court had
found that performance licenses for individual songs could be obtained
directly from composers and publishers; and thus, the Court of Appeals
concluded that blanket licensing is not absolutely necessary. Since it is
not, the market-necessity exception to the rule that price-fixing is illegal
per se did not apply. And that is why a majority of the appellate court
ruled that blanket licensing is illegal.
Despite its conclusion that blanket licensing is illegal per se, the
appellate court did not order that its use be enjoined. Instead, it ac-
knowledged that blanket licensing may "serve a market need" and "is
not simply a 'naked restraint' ineluctably doomed to extinction. '"' The
Court of Appeals therefore indicated that if ASCAP and BMI were
required to provide some form of per use license which ensured compe-
tition among composers and publishers, blanket licenses might still be
issued to those who preferred them.
Circuit Judge Moore concurred in the majority's conclusion to re-
mand the case. His reasons for doing so were unclear, however, be-
cause he specifically noted his disagreement with the majority's ruling
that blanket licensing is a form of price-fixing that is not saved by the
88. CBS v. ASCAP, supra note 12.
89. Id. at 139.
90. Id. at 136.
91. Id. at 140.
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"market necessity" defense.92 Judge Moore's views of the case eventu-
ally became quite significant. In the meantime, however, it was AS-
CAP's and BMI's turn to appeal, and appeal they did to the United
States Supreme Court.
4. The Supreme Court Decision
The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case, and in 1979, it re-
versed the Court of Appeals. In a decision issued under the name
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. ,93 the
Court held that the blanket licenses issued by ASCAP and BMI are not
illegalper se. Justice White, writing for an eight-to-one majority, ac-
knowledged that price-fixing agreements are illegalper se. "But," he
added, "easy labels do not always supply ready answers.""4 The
Supreme Court had never examined a practice like blanket licensing
before. Indeed, it noted that "[i]n dealing with performing rights in the
music industry we confront conditions both in copyright law and in
antitrust law which are sui generis."gs
Furthermore, the Court quoted with approval from an amicus
memorandum the Justice Department had filed in the K-91 case in
which the Government had argued that ASCAP's blanket licensing of
radio stations was not illegalper se nor even an unreasonable restraint
of trade. "The Sherman Act has always been discriminatingly applied
in light of economic realities," the Government had said.96 And in the
radio industry at least, the "economic realities" required blanket licens-
ing. That view had satisfied the Supreme Court sufficiently in 1968
that it denied K-91's petition for certiorari. Eleven years later in the
CBS case, the Justice Department filed an amicus brief indicating that
it still was of the view that blanket licensing was not illegal per se,
though the Department took no position on whether blanket licensing
was an unreasonable restraint of trade in the network television
business.
The Court took note that in the new Copyright Act, Congress itself
provided for blanket licensing of cable television systems, jukebox op-
erators and noncommercial broadcasters. "Though these provisions
are not directly controlling, they do reflect an opinion that the blanket
92. Id. at 141.
93. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
94. Id. at 8.
95. Id. at 10 (quoting the Court of Appeals' decision in CBS v. ASCAP, supra note 12, at
132).
96. Id. at 14.
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license, and ASCAP, are economically beneficial at least in some
circumstances." 9'
The Court also noted that,
• . . the line of commerce allegedly being restrained, the per-
formance rights to copyrighted music, exists at all only be-
cause of the copyright laws. . . . Although the copyright law
confers no rights on copyright owners to fix prices among
themselves or otherwise violate the antitrust laws, we would
not expect that any market arrangements reasonably neces-
sary to effectuate the rights that are granted would be deemed
a per se violation of the Sherman Act. Otherwise, the com-
merce anticipated by the Copyright Act and protected against
restraint by the Sherman Act would not exist at all or would
exist only as a pale reminder of what Congress envisioned.9"
And the Court expressed the view that a blanket license is not a
"naked restraint of trade. . . but rather accompanies the integration of
sales, monitoring, and enforcement against unauthorized copyright
use."
99
Finally, the Court described the blanket license as being "truly
greater than the sum of its parts; it is, to some extent, a different prod-
uct." " To the extent the blanket license is a different product, ASCAP
and BMI are not joint selling agencies offering the individual songs of
many composers and publishers, but are separate sellers offering their
own product: a blanket license "of which the individual compositions
are raw material."' 0'
The Court remanded the case to the Second Circuit where it ap-
peared that blanket licensing would be evaluated under the rule of rea-
son. When the Court of Appeals took up the case a second time,
however, it found it unnecessary to make such an evaluation.
5. The Second Court of Appeals Decision
By the time the case returned to the Court of Appeals, two of the
three judges who had heard it before had passed away. Judge
Moore - who wrote a concurring opinion the first time - remained.
But Judge Newman wrote the decision of a unanimous panel
following the second oral argument. The decision the second time
97. Id. at 16.
98. Id. at 18-19.
99. Id. at 20.
100. Id. at 21-22.
101. Id. at 22.
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around was that the blanket licenses offered to the networks by ASCAP
and BMI do not restrain trade at all, let alone unreasonably. In so
ruling, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's original deci-
sion, for the reasons given in the District Court's opinion. That is, the
Court of Appeals finally agreed that blanket licenses do not restrain
trade if alternatives are realistically available. Here, the alternative -
direct licenses from individual composers and publishers - was found
to be "fully available." This being so, the court ruled that ASCAP and
BMI do not violate the antitrust laws by offering blanket licenses to the
television networks. °2 The Supreme Court denied CBS's petition for
certiorari.1
0 3
IV. LOCAL TV STATION DISSATISFACTION WITH
BLANKET LICENSING
A. Local Stations Distinguishedfrom Network Stations
There are more than 750 commercial television stations in the
United States. ABC, CBS and NBC have approximately 200 affiliates
each, and thus about 600 of the nations' commercial stations are net-
work affiliates. The unaffiliated 150 or so stations are known as "in-
dependents." But in the parlance of the Buffalo Broadcasting case, all
but fifteen of the more than 750 are "local television stations." The
three networks own five television stations each, and these fifteen sta-
tions are the only ones that are not "local" stations. All the rest are
local stations, including the 600 that are affiliated with the networks
(though owned by someone else). °'
Local television stations broadcast three kinds of programming.
Those that are network affiliates devote a substantial portion of their
time to network programming such as national news, sporting events,
prime-time series, and specials.'0 5
Network affiliates and independent stations broadcast syndicated
programming. Syndicated programs are of several types. Most of them
are "off-network" programs - that is, programs that were first broad-
cast by network owned and affiliated stations. Syndicated program-
ming also includes theatrical motion pictures that have completed their
theater "runs." (Theatrical motion pictures suitable for television usu-
ally are broadcast by one of the networks - and recently, by one or
102. 620 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1980).
103. 450 U.S. 970 (1981).
104. Buffalo Broadcasting v. ASCAP, supra note 31, at 279.
105. Id.
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more of the pay-television services - before they are syndicated.) Syn-
dicated programming also includes "first-run" syndicated programs
which are shows that are produced especially for syndication."°
Finally, network affiliates and independents also broadcast locally
produced programming - that is, programs which local stations pro-
duce themselves. Locally produced programs usually are local news,
sports, public affairs and talk shows. °0
The CBS case concerned only the licensing of music for use in
network programming. It did not deal with the licensing of music for
syndicated or locally produced programming. Buffalo Broadcasting, on
the other hand, dealt solely with syndicated (including off-network)
and locally produced programming.1
0 8
B. The All-Industry Television Station Music License Committee
ASCAP's negotiations with the television industry in 1948 and
1949 were conducted on behalf of television broadcasters principally by
the networks. Though an agreement was reached in 1949, local stations
were not satisfied with it. As a result, in 1949, local stations organized
the All-Industry Television Station Music License Committee to act as
their collective bargaining representative in future negotiations with
ASCAP and BMI.I°9
When the ASCAP Consent Decree was amended ir ,950 to allow
for the judicial determination of a "reasonable fee," the Committee
filed an application for such a determination in an effort to lower its
members' license fees. Apparently, the Committee enjoyed some suc-
cess, because in 1954, before the court issued a ruling, the proceeding
was settled and a new industry-wide licensing agreement was signed.' 'o
Another such agreement was signed in 1958. But in 1962, negotiations
broke down, and local stations petitioned the District Court under the
Consent Decree once again.
C. Local Station Applicationfor New Form of License
The license agreements negotiated in 1949, 1954 and 1958 all re-
quired local television stations to pay fees for music used in syndicated
and locally produced programming. Those agreements did not require
network affiliates to pay fees for network programming, because the
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 288.
110. Id.
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networks themselves obtained blanket licenses for the programs their
own stations and affiliates broadcast.
When the 1958 agreement was about to expire, the Committee
asked ASCAP for a local station license that would have excluded syn-
dicated as well as network programming from its fee formula. The
Committee did not deny the need for performance licenses for syndi-
cated programming. Local stations merely intended to have the produ-
cers of syndicated programs get the licenses themselves, from ASCAP
or from composers and publishers directly. The Committee apparently
believed that producers could get performance licenses more cheaply.
Or perhaps the Committee believed that producers would not seek -
or would not be able - to pass along the cost of performance licenses
when they sold local stations the right to broadcast their programming.
The Committee wanted ASCAP to continue issuing blanket licenses to
local stations for the music they used in, the original programming they
produced themselves, however.
ASCAP refused to issue the sort of license requested by the Com-
mittee. As a result, 335 local television stations filed a petition under
the ASCAP Consent Decree asking the District Court to fix a reason-
able fee for the sort of license the Committee had proposed. The court
refused to do so, however. It ruled that the license the Committee
sought was "a radically different license" from those that had been in
use for the past twelve years - and, more importantly, was one which
the Consent Decree did not require ASCAP to issue.II The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed;" 2 and the United States Supreme
Court denied the stations' petition for certiorari." 3
Although the local stations argued that ASCAP's refusal to issue
the type of license they sought was anti-competitive, the only issue de-
cided by the case was'that the ASCAP Consent Decree did not require
such a license. In fact, the Court of Appeals concluded its decision
with some legal advice. If the local stations' contention "has the merit
under the antitrust laws which they assert, they have effective remedies
available,""' the appellate court explained. They could persuade the
Justice Department to apply for a modification of the Consent Decree.
Or they could bring a private antitrust suit of their own. Fourteen
I1I. US v. ASCAP (Application of Shenandoah Valley Broadcasting, Inc.), 208 F. Supp.
896 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
112. 331 F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1964).
113. 377 U.S. 997 (1964).
114. 331 F.2d at 124.
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years later, local stations took that advice by filing the Buffalo Broad-
casting case.
D. The Buffalo Broadcasting Case
In 1978, five owners of local television stations filed a class action
lawsuit against ASCAP, BMI and their members and affiliates. The
complaint alleged that the blanket licensing of local stations is an an-
ticompetitive restraint of trade. More particularly, the plaintiffs as-
serted that blanket licensing is "needless, anomalous, inefficient and
coercive";" I5 that the "splitting"" I6 of performance and synchronization
rights results in the absence of price competition among musical com-
positions; and that market "realities" '" 7 prevent local stations from ob-
taining reasonable alternatives. As a result, the plaintiffs sought an
injunction prohibiting ASCAP and BMI from issuing performance
licenses to local stations in order to permit the "evolution"" 8 of a li-
censing system in which composers and publishers compete with one
another. The "brave new world""' 9 envisioned by the plaintiffs is one
in which producers of syndicated programming obtain performance
licenses directly from composers and publishers at the same time syn-
chronization rights are obtained. The plaintiffs also claimed - at least
at first - that local stations wanted the "opportunity"' 20 t- obtain per-
formance licenses directly from composers and publishers for the origi-
nal programs local stations produce themselves.
ASCAP and BMI disputed all of the plaintiffs' contentions, includ-
ing the contention that blanket licensing eliminates price competition.
As far as ASCAP and BMI were concerned, Buffalo Broadcasting was
nothing more than an "off-network rerun"'' of the CBS case, and as
such, should have been dismissed.
1. The August 1982 Opinion
In August of 1982, following a lengthy trial, the court concluded
that the blanket licensing of local television stations does restrain trade
in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, and that therefore, AS-
CAP and BMI, and their members and affiliates, had to be enjoined
115. Buffalo Broadcasting v. ASCAP, supra note 31, at 285.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 276.
119. Id. at 285.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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from continuing to do so.' 22
The court agreed that the CBS case was the controlling precedent;
and it agreed with CBS that blanket licensing would not restrain trade
at all if there were "realistically available alternatives." The court de-
fined "realistically available alternatives" as those that were reasonably
efficient and not unreasonably costly. 23 The court then considered the
alternatives available to local television stations, and it concluded that
none were realistically available.
The court found that per program licenses were too costly and too
burdensome to be realistically available (despite the Consent Decrees'
requirement that per program licenses be offered on terms that guar-
anty music users a "genuine economic choice").' 24
The court also found that local stations could not realistically ob-
tain licenses directly from copyright owners (such licenses are known as
"direct licenses"), because it would be impractical and expensive for
stations to search for and obtain licenses from thousands of composers
and publishers. In CBS, it was found that the Harry Fox Agency could
and would expand its functions to serve as a publishers' agent for the
issuance of performance as well as synchronization licenses. However,
the Buffalo Broadcasting court distinguished CBS. It did so on the
grounds that although the networks have sufficient market power to
compel publishers to issue performance licenses directly, local stations
(acting individually) do not have the power to do so. Since local sta-
tions do not have sufficient market power to compel publishers to issue
performance licenses directly, the Fox Agency would have no reason to
expand its operations.
25
Similarly, the court found that altogether the networks have suffi-
cient market power to compel producers to obtain performance licenses
directly from composers and publishers (such licenses are known as
"source licenses"), local stations do not have such power; and therefore,
producers would not do so.126
For these reasons, the court concluded that insofar as local televi-
sion stations are concerned, there is no realistically available alterna-
tive to blanket licensing, so long as blanket licensing is permitted.
Having determined that blanket licensing does restrain trade in the
local television business - unlike the network television business
122. Id. at 296.
123. Id. at 286.
124. Id. at 288-89.
125. Id. at 289-91.
126. Id. at 291-93.
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where it does not - the court proceeded to balance its restraints
against its benefits under the rule of reason. According to the court, the
anticompetitive effects of blanket licensing are "apparent."' 27 Compo-
sitions are sold on an all-or-nothing basis so that the selling power of
one adds to that of the others and the monopoly power of all is en-
larged. Furthermore, blanket licensing prevents price competition.
And it prevents local stations from reducing their music costs by reduc-
ing their use of music.
2 8
The court did acknowledge that blanket licensing does have "rec-
ognized virtues" and "efficiencies"' 29 which make it pro-competitive
and necessary for users such as nightclubs and restaurants that cannot
predict their music needs. However, said the court, television stations
are not akin to local taverns in this regard, and the benefits of blanket
licensing of television stations do not balance its burdens for several
reasons.
First, the court found that the transaction cost savings afforded by
blanket licensing are negligible, because performance licenses can be
obtained by producers at the same time they obtain synchronization
licenses. (For reasons explained below, blanket licensing does afford
transaction cost savings.) The transaction cost savings for locally pro-
duced programming also were found to be "insignificant"-at least at
first-because local stations deal directly with "many" of the compos-
ers and publishers of music used in locally produced programs.
30
The court said that there had been no indication that monitoring
costs would be significant in the absence of blanket licensing, because
there is no "credible threat" of unauthorized use of music by local tele-
vision stations.' 3' (No evidence was cited in support of this optimistic
conclusion; and the court failed to explain how local stations could be
certain that music in syndicated programming is properly licensed.)
Nor does blanket licensing reduce "up-front" costs for producers
because performance rights fees are only a "miniscule percentage" of
the cost of producing programs. 32 (In fact, performance rights fees are
no portion of the cost of producing television programs, because such
fees have been paid by broadcasters, not producers.)
Finally, the court found that flexibility is not important for syndi-
127. Id. at 293.
128. Id. at 293-94.
129. Id. at 294.
130. Id. at 294-95.
131. Id. at 295.
132. Id.
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cated programming, because unplanned performances of music on tele-
vision are rare.' 33 (The court failed to say what should be done in
those rare instances, however.)
Thus, the court concluded that the insignificant cost savings of
blanket licensing do not balance its anti-competitive consequences.
And this was the reason the court ruled that blanket licensing violates
the Sherman Act and "must accordingly be enjoined."' 34 It took until
January of 1983 for the parties and the court to work out the exact
language of the injunction.
2. The January 1983 Judgment
Following the court's August 1982 opinion, the parties spent the
balance of 1982 trying to work out mutually satisfactory language for
an injunction, but by and large were unable to do so. The court held
several post-trial hearings and ruled on some areas of disagreement.
Finally, in January of 1983, a Judgment and Permanent Injunction was
signed and entered.
35
The judgment enjoins ASCAP and BMI from granting perform-
ance licenses to local television stations for music used in syndicated
programs, commencing February 1, 1984.136 Apparently, the reason
for the year's delay in the effective date of the injunction is to allow
time for ASCAP and BMI to appeal (they have), and to give the indus-
try time to adjust its music licensing procedures. It should be noted
that the injunction bars ASCAP and BMI from issuing performance
licenses of any kind to local stations.137 ASCAP and BMI therefore are
prohibited from issuing not only blanket and per program licenses, but
even per use licenses (that is, licenses for the use of individual composi-
tions). The purpose of this sweeping prohibition seems to be to compel
composers and publishers to issue performance licenses to producers at
the same time they issue synchronization licenses.
The judgment contains one provision that is surprising in light of
the plaintiffs' original contentions and the court's August 1982 opinion.
ASCAP and BMI are not prohibited from granting local stations "any
form of mutually agreed upon license" for music used in locally pro-
133. Id. at 295-96.
134. Id. at 296.
135. Judgment and Permanent Injunction in Buffalo Broadcasting v. ASCAP, U.S.D.C.,
S.D.N.Y. Case No. 78 Civ. 5670 (filed and entered Jan. 4, 1983).
136. Id. at 11.
137. Id. at 4.
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ducedprogramming.38 Apparently, once the thrill of victory subsided,
even the plaintiffs perceived that when local stations themselves act as
producers, the efficiency and convenience of blanket licensing may well
outweigh the supposedly anti-competitive effects it has on price, and
thus local stations may want to obtain blanket licenses for the programs
they produce themselves. This means that of the three types of televi-
sion programming - network, syndicated and locally produced -
blanket licensing is illegal only for one type: syndicated programming.
The judgment also provides that during the year between Febru-
ary 1, 1983 and February 1, 1984 (the judgment's effective date), local
stations have the right to obtain blanket licenses, even for syndicated
programs, by paying the same license fees they paid in 1980. These
fees are to be paid in monthly installments and may be canceled by
local stations on 30 days notice. This provision seems to recognize that
until the effective date of the injunction, there will be little if any direct
licensing by composers and publishers, and until there is, local stations
will need blanket licenses. If the effective date of the injunction is post-
poned beyond February 1, 1984, or if local stations do begin to obtain
performance licenses directly, the judgment authorizes stations to seek
a reduction in the blanket license fee below the 1980 amount.
139
After the judgment has been in effect five years, ASCAP and BMI
are authorized to apply to the court for permission to issue per program
licenses for syndicated programs."4 Apparently, this provision was in-
cluded because the plaintiffs and the court recognized that licensing by
composers and publishers may not achieve the economies that are ex-
pected by the plaintiffs and the court, and a reversion, at least in part,
to past practices may be appropriate. The five-year wait seems
designed to assure the creation of the necessary apparatus for the nego-
tiation of performance licenses on a composition-by-composition basis.
Finally, the court retained jurisdiction to determine the amount of
damage, if any, that local stations have suffered on account of blanket
licensing." I Trial of that issue has been postponed, pending a decision
on ASCAP's and BMI's appeal.
3. Issues Raised by the Opinion and Judgment
Because the facts of CBS were virtually identical to those of Buf-
falo Broadcasting, and because blanket licensing now has been out-
138. Id.
139. Id. at 7-9.
140. Id. at 10.
141. Id. at 5-7.
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lawed only for syndicated programming but not for network or locally
produced programming, the Buffalo Broadcasting case raises three
issues.
First, was the court in Buffalo Broadcasting correct in concluding
that local television stations do not have sufficient bargaining power to
induce composers and publishers to grant performance licenses to pro-
ducers at the same time synchronization licenses are issued? The
court's conclusion that local stations do not have sufficient bargaining
power to do so was not a finding of observed fact, because local stations
had never asked for such licenses before the complaint in Buffalo
Broadcasting was filed.' 42 Rather, the court's conclusion concerning
the bargaining power of local stations was based on nothing more than
economic theory applied to the court's findings concerning the struc-
ture of the television industry. Findings concerning structure and find-
ings concerning power are not the same thing, however. Moreover,
given the structure of the television industry as actually found by the
court, economic theory and studies indicate that local stations do have
the bargaining power to induce source licensing by producers.
Second, should the result in Buffalo Broadcasting (or the result in
CBS for that matter) have turned on the power of broadcasters to
avoid blanket licensing? In other words, assuming broadcasters do not
have the power to compel alternate forms of licensing, does blanket
licensing affect competition in a way that it should be illegal?
Finally, what does the result in Buffalo Broadcasting say about the
role of economic theory, and its relation to legal doctrine, in the inter-
pretation of the antitrust laws?
V. ECONOMICS AND THE BARGAINING POWER OF LOCAL STATIONS
The single most significant finding made by the court in Buffalo
Broadcasting was that local television stations do not have sufficient
bargaining power to induce producers to obtain performance licenses
directly from composers and publishers. In the court's view, local sta-
tions lack the bargaining power to do so, except at "premium prices,"
for the following reason.
In most television markets there are three . . . local sta-
tions. . . . Thus, . . . despite the large number of syndicators
and syndicated programming available to local stations, com-
petition within each television market for desirable programs
on whose acquisition the viability of most local stations de-
142. Buffalo Broadcasting v. ASCAP, supra note 31, at 291.
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pends is vigorous. . . .The evidence also establishes that the
distribution of syndicated programs is concentrated on eight
leading companies. In 1981 these companies distributed 52%
of all syndicated programs (not including motion pictures
produced initially for theatrical exhibition) and 82% of the
off-network syndicated programs. The broadcast of some of
the syndicated programming distributed by these companies
is essential to the successful, profitable operation of most local
television stations. This concentration in the distribution
market lends additional support to the conclusion that, within
each television market, the distributor is often in a powerful
bargaining position vis-a-vis the local television station seek-
ing to purchase syndicated programming, particularly with re-
gard to desirable off-network programs.'
The court's conclusion is faulty in four respects. First, the court
concluded that "competition within each television market . . . is vig-
orous" because three local stations bid against one another for desira-
ble syndicated programming. On the other hand, the court concluded
that the distribution of such programming is "concentrated" in eight
companies. These conclusions are exactly the reverse of what they
should have been. For according to economic theory, a market with
only three buyers is "concentrated" while a market with eight sellers
(which together account for 52% to 82% of sales) is "competitive." In-
deed, according to the Merger Guidelines of the Department of Justice,
which use the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of market concentration, a
three-firm market is deemed "highly concentrated" while a market in
which eight firms account for 52% to 82% of sales is characterized as
"unconcentrated."' 44 One economist known for his work in the field of
industrial organization considers three-firm markets in general to be
"very highly concentrated"' 45 and the local television market in partic-
ular to be highly or very highly concentrated."4 On the other hand, he
considers markets in which eight firms control 45% to 70% to have only
"low-moderate" concentration. 47 One economist who has studied the
music industry has said that "[w]hen there are only three major buyers,
those buyers have substantial monopsony [i.e., buyers' monopoly]
143. Id. at 280-81.
144. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Merger Guidelines, 47 Fed. Reg. 28493,
28497 (1982).
145. J. Bain, Industrial Organization 137 (2d ed. 1968).
146. Id. at 145.
147. Id. at 141.
1983]
LOYOLA ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL
power - the power to lower prices."' 48
Second, as the Buffalo Broadcasting court itself acknowledged,
there are actually hundreds of syndicators and thousands of syndicated
programs. 49 Because of the very small number of stations in each
market as compared to the large number of syndicators and programs,
economists who have studied the television industry have concluded
that the distributor side of the syndication business is "competitively
structured"150 and that local stations enjoy bargaining leverage over the
distributors 5 I - not vice versa as the court found in Buffalo Broadcast-
ing. In fact, it has been observed that in markets having only a small
number of stations and small audiences, prices for syndicated programs
are likely to be close to the marginal costs of distributing those pro-
grams. 152 In larger markets, the price of syndicated programming de-
pends on several factors including the popularity of the program, the
number of runs licensed, the amount of advertising time available dur-
ing the program, the presence or absence of an independent station in
the market, the market's size, and whether the owner of the buying
station owns other stations as well.
153
Third, the court found that (in 1981) 57% of the 200 leading syndi-
cated programs were off-network shows.' 5 4 As to this 57%, the bargain-
ing power of local stations should not have been measured alone;
because insofar as these programs are concerned, the bargaining power
of local stations rides "piggy-back" on the networks' power to induce
source licensing by producers. Because it failed to consider this "piggy-
back" effect, the court significantly understated the extent to which
source licensing is a "realistically available alternative" to blanket li-
censing. The remaining 43% of the leading syndicated programs were
first-run programs. 55 The economics of first-run syndication are such
that distributors must be responsive to the wishes of local stations. This
is so, because first-run syndications must earn enough to cover produc-
tion as well as selling and distribution expenses, 56 and it takes revenue
from a significant number of local stations to do so. In fact, first-run
148. Cirace, supra note 12, at 281 n.34.
149. Buffalo Broadcasting v. ASCAP, supra note 31, at 280.
150. 2 FCC Network Inquiry Special Staff, New Television Networks: Entry, Jurisdic-
tion, Ownership and Regulation 566 (1980).
151. Id. at 529.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 425, 641-42.
154. Buffalo Broadcasting v. ASCAP, supra note 31, at 279.
155. Id.
156. FCC Network Inquiry Special Staff, supra note 150, at 641.
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programming rarely goes into production at all until a sufficient
number of local stations have agreed to purchase the program to cover
its anticipated production costs.' 57
Fourth, the court concluded that local stations lack bargaining
power because competition within each market for desirable programs
is "vigorous" while the distribution of syndicated programs is "concen-
trated." In fact, the distributors of popular programs would enjoy the
same degree of bargaining power, and competition among local sta-
tions would remain just as vigorous, even if there were thousands of
syndicators each with just a fraction of the market. This is so because
each television program as a whole (as well as the music in it) is pro-
tected by copyright.'58 Thus, the syndicator of each program enjoys a
complete but perfectly legal monopoly as to that particular show.
For these reasons, local stations do have the power to induce
source and direct licensing. Therefore, blanket licensing of local sta-
tions is legal, just as the CBS case held that blanket licensing of net-
works is legal. Moreover, even if local stations do lack the bargaining
power to induce source and direct licensing, blanket licensing does not
give ASCAP and BMI the power to charge greater than competitive
prices; and therefore, it should not have been held illegal in any event.
VI. THE ECONOMICS OF Music LICENSING
A. General Principles
Under perfectly competitive conditions, price and quantity are de-
termined by the market forces of supply and demand. The quantity of
an item that is produced, and the price that is charged for it, are por-
trayed on a graph by the intersection of the supply and demand curves
for that item; for at that intersection the amount purchased at the price
charged will be equal to the amount supplied at the price paid.'59
However, the natural market forces of supply and demand do not oper-
ate normally in the music business for four reasons.
First, the supply curve for an item usually is the same as its margi-
nal cost curve' 6° (a concept explained below); but the marginal cost of
additional consumption of musical compositions is zero or even nega-
157. Id. at 413.
158. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(3), (6), (7).
159. P. Samuelson, Economics 57 (1 ith ed. 1980); L. Sullivan, Handbook of the Law of
Antitrust 800-01 (1977).
160. P. Samuelson, supra note 159, at 430; E. Gellhorn, Antitrust Law and Economics 55
(2d ed. 1981).
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tive. 61 This means that according to economic theory, the "competi-
tive" price for music would be zero (or less) - a price at which no one
would sell for long in the real world. Second, musical compositions
can be "consumed" without leaving less for others to consume (unlike
apples, for example,which when consumed do leave less for others).'62
Third, once music has been heard by the public, it is difficult (and ex-
pensive) to prevent people from using it, even if they do not pay for it
(unlike apples which can be withheld from the market and released
only in exchange for payment). Furthermore, "free riders" who use
music without paying for it do not contribute towards the cost of creat-
ing that music, nor do they pay the full cost of their own use of it.'
63
For these three reasons, natural market forces would not work in the
music business even if thousands of individual composers offered to is-
sue individual per use licenses to thousands of individual music users
at prices determined by direct one-to-one negotiations."6
The fourth reason natural market forces do not work in the music
business is that historically, and for good reasons, blanket licenses have
been the norm.' 65 These blanket licenses have been issued by ASCAP
and BMI which are virtual monopolists in the blanket license market.
And in most cases, ASCAP's and BMI's customers are, or have banded
together in industry-wide trade associations to become, virtual
monopsonists. 
66
Although natural market forces are not at work in the music busi-
ness, the forces actually at work can be described.
B. The Economics of Blanket Licensing
Figure 1 is a graphic portrayal of the supply and demand forces at
work in the ASCAP and BMI markets for blanket licenses.
Figure l's vertical axis measures the Price of each blanket license
issued and the Cost to ASCAP or BMI of supplying it. The horizontal
axis measures the number of blanket licenses issued. Since each music
161. See infra text accompanying notes 172-74.
162. BMI v. Moor-Law, Inc., supra note 16, at 763; Cirace, supra note 12, at 282.
163. BMI v. Moor-Law, Inc., supra note 16, at 763.
164. Cf., Cirace, supra note 12, at 298, 300-03.
165. See supra text accompanying notes I through 42.
166. See supra text accompanying note 109; BMI v. Moor-Law, Inc., supra note 16, at
761; Cirace, supra note 12, at 281.
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user needs only one blanket license from each organization,'67 the
number of licenses issued is equal to the number of music users who
take them.
Price Per Blanket
License and Marginal
Cost of Supplying it
P, (+)
P 2 (+)
P 3 (0)
MC, (0)
MC 2 (-)
MC 3 ()
Figure 1
The Demand Curve for Blanket Licenses slopes downward and to
167. Because a blanket license authorizes the use of all of the compositions in the organi-
zation's repertory. See supra note 8, and accompanying text.
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the right (as does the demand curve for virtually every other commod-
ity or service)."68 This is so for the logical reason that as the price of a
blanket license drops, more music users will take licenses. At any one
moment, the number of music users is finite, and thus the number of
blanket licenses that can be issued - even at a price of zero - is finite
as well. For simplicity, the Demand Curve in Figure 1 is shown as a
straight line which tapers evenly to a price of zero (P3) at a quantity
(Q3) which is equal to the total number of music users.
The Marginal Revenue Curve represents the additional revenue
received by ASCAP or BMI from the issuance of the last additional
blanket license.'69 The Marginal Revenue Curve slopes downward and
to the right, because, as the Demand Curve indicates, in order to sell
more blanket licenses, ASCAP and BMI must reduce the price they
charge for all; and thus, as more are sold, the additional (or "margi-
nal") revenue received from the sale of each additional license de-
creases as well.' The Marginal Revenue Curve always is exactly
twice as steep as the Demand Curve. 7 '
Three Marginal Cost Curves are shown in Figure 1, each depicting
an alternate assumption concerning ASCAP's and BMI's marginal
costs. Marginal cost is the additional cost of producing one more of
whatever a business sells.' 72 The Marginal Cost Curve for most things
is U-shaped. That is, it falls at first as additional units are produced,
but eventually it rises indicating that the additional cost of producing
an additional unit increases as the number of units produced in-
creases. 7 3 The Marginal Cost Curves shown in Figure 1 are flat and
do not rise above zero. The reason for this is that it costs ASCAP and
BMI nothing to issue an additional blanket license, because music can
be performed by any number of people without leaving less for others
to perform. Therefore, when ASCAP and BMI issue blanket licenses,
they do not have to produce (or acquire) more music in order to issue
additional blanket licenses. ASCAP and BMI can and do issue many
blanket licenses to the very same music. And no one is the worse off
for it.
One of the Marginal Cost Curves shown in Figure 1 (MC I) depicts
a marginal cost of zero. Previously, those who have thought about AS-
168. P. Samuelson, supra note 159, at 53-55; L. Sullivan, supra note 159, at 798; E. Gell-
horn, supra note 160, at 45.
169. P. Samuelson, supra note 159, at 464-67.
170. P. Samuelson, supra note 159, at 466; E. Gellhorn, supra note 160, at 61.
171. P. Samuelson, supra note 159, at 466-67; E. Gellhorn, supra note 160, at 61 n.13.
172. P. Samuelson, supra note 159, at 428.
173. Id.
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CAP's and BMI's marginal co.ts have concluded that they are zero.' 74
It appears, however, that ASCAP's and BMI's marginal costs actually
are negative, because each time they issue an additional blanket license,
a potential copyright infringer is eliminated, and thus their copyright
enforcement expenses are reduced. If, for example, every music user
took a blanket license, ASCAP and BMI would have no copyright en-
forcement expenses at all. For this reason, Figure 1 also depicts two
negative Marginal Cost Curves (MC2 and MC3). They are alternatives
to one another. Each depicts an amount of additional savings achieved
from the issuance of an additional blanket license. (MC3 depicts
greater marginal savings than MC2.) Figure 1 assumes that copyright
enforcement costs are uniform for each potential infringer; and thus,
the marginal savings achieved from the issuance of additional blanket
licenses are shown as uniform as well. In real life, ASCAP's and BMI's
marginal savings may not be uniform. However, these savings always
will be depicted by a negative Marginal Cost Curve, and that is the key
point for the analysis that follows. Whether that curve is flat, sloped or
curved does not affect the conclusions to be drawn from that analysis.
1. The Economics of Licensing Numerous, Unorganized
Music Users
ASCAP and BMI issue blanket licenses to music users who are
engaged in a wide variety of businesses. Some of ASCAP's and BMI's
customers have organized themselves into industry-wide associations
for the purpose of bargaining with ASCAP and BMI. Others have not
done so however, even though there are many of them in the same
business and even though they are enough alike that ASCAP and BMI
issue identical licenses containing uniform fee schedules to all of them.
There are, for example, thousands of nightclubs in which music is per-
formed, and which therefore need performance licenses. Although ho-
tels negotiate with ASCAP and BMI through a hotel industry trade
association, nightclubs do not. 75 Given the great number of night-
clubs, their competition with one another (at least within geographic
markets), their relatively small size, and their lack of organization, it
might be expected that ASCAP and BMI would wield monopoly power
over nightclubs, and in doing so, would limit output and charge higher
than competitive prices. In fact, ASCAP and BMI do not. Figure 1
indicates why not.
174. BMI v. Moor-Law, Inc., supra note 16, at 763; Cirace, supra note 12, at 282.
175. BMI v. Moor-Law, Inc., supra note 16, at 761.
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According to economic theory, a monopolist maximizes its profit
by expanding its output until its marginal costs equal its marginal reve-
nue and then pricing its product at whatever amount its customers' de-
mand curve indicates is necessary to sell the quantity produced.,76
Profit is maximized in this fashion, because so long as marginal reve-
nue (the amount earned from the sale of an additional unit) exceeds
marginal cost (the cost of producing an additional unit), there is profit
to be made from producing and selling an additional unit. Once mar-
ginal costs exceed marginal revenue, however, additional production
and sale results in a marginal loss. The profit-maximizing monopolist
expands output and sales so long as it is marginally profitable to do so,
but quits when further expansion results in a marginal loss.
Therefore, according to economic theory, if ASCAP's and BMI's
marginal costs were zero, their marginal costs would equal their margi-
nal revenues at quantity Q 1, and that is the number of blanket licenses
they would issue at price P1 per license. In a perfectly competitive
market, the supply of music (i.e., its marginal cost) would equal the
nightclubs' demand for music at quantity Q3 and price P3. Thus, it
appears at first that ASCAP and BMI would exert monopoly power
over nightclubs by limiting the number of blanket licenses issued (QI is
less than Q3) and by charging a higher than competitive price (P1 is
higher than P3).
Initial appearances are deceiving however. Note that if ASCAP
and BMI issue only QI licenses, several music users (Q3 minus Q 1) will
be left without blanket licenses. ASCAP and BMI cannot be indiffer-
ent to this, because as long as some music users do not have licenses,
ASCAP and BMI will have to spend money on copyright enforcement
to be certain that those who do not have licenses do not take a "free
ride" by using music without paying for it. This is why ASCAP's and
BMI's marginal costs actually are negative. If their true marginal cost
curve is represented by MC2, marginal cost equals marginal revenue at
quantity Q2, at which point the price for each blanket license will be
P2. If their true marginal cost curve is represented by MC3, marginal
cost equals marginal revenue at quantity Q3, at which point (theoreti-
cally) the price for each blanket license will be P3. In other words,
ASCAP's and BMI's ability to charge higher-than-competitive licens-
ing fees is directly inhibited by its copyright enforcement costs; and if
those costs become great enough, the result is precisely the same as it
would be under perfectly competitive conditions.
176. E. Gellhorn, supra note 160, at 63; L. Sullivan, supra note 159, at 805; P. Samuelson,
supra note 159, at 467.
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The dampening effect that copyright enforcement costs have on
the licensing fees charged by ASCAP and BMI is more than mere eco-
nomic theory. In Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Moor-Law, Inc., the District
Court found, as an observed fact, that,
[wihile normal competitive forces do not operate in this mar-
ket, it is not true that BMI's price for its [nightclub] license is
unconstrained. Testimony at trial convinced me that the free
rider problem does provide a significant constraint on the
price BMI charges. The higher the price it charges, the
greater the resistance of [nightclub] users is likely to be, and,
conversely, the lower the price, the lower the resistance will
be. Since the free rider problem tends to make BMI's en-
forcement costs high and can, indeed, cause increased costs to
more than consume increased revenue from a higher price,
BMI considers this problem when setting a price.'77
2. The Economics of Licensing Organized Music Users
Several kinds of music users - including radio and television sta-
tions, and hotels and motels - have organized themselves into indus-
try-wide trade associations for the purpose of bargaining collectively
with ASCAP and BMI.' 78 Collective bargaining by buyers tends to off-
set whatever monopolistic bargaining power sellers otherwise might
have had.'79 This tendency is known as the "concept of countervailing
power." 8 0 In effect, collective bargaining by buyers creates a "bilateral
monopoly" in which neither side is able to dominate the other; and the
outcome of negotiations will approximate (though not necessarily du-
plicate) those expected in a competitive market.' 8 '
In the music business in particular, collective bargaining by hotels
and motels was viewed by the court in BMI v. Moor-Law as a "rem-
edy" for what it considered to be the absence of price competition
among composers and publishers. 8 2 In Buffalo Broadcasting the court
also appears to have recognized that the All-Industry Committee en-
joyed at least some measure of countervailing power, because the court
found that in earlier years, local stations had agreed to blanket licenses
177. BMI v. Moor-Law, Inc., supra note 16, at 764.
178. Id. at 761; Buffalo Broadcasting v. ASCAP, supra note 31, at 288.
179. BMI v. Moor-Law, Inc., supra note 16, at 772; Cirace, supra note 12, at 284.
180. J.K. Galbraith, American Capitalism: The Concept of Countervailing Power (1952);
F.M. Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance 306 (2d ed. 1980).
181. J. Bain, supra note 145, at 152.
182. BMI v. Moor-Law, Inc., supra note 16, at 772.
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as a necessary "compromise."' 83 The court did not explain what the
compromise had involved. Conceivably, the court meant that local sta-
tions had agreed to blanket licenses in order to get licenses at all; but
this seems unlikely. The license fees received by ASCAP and BMI
from local stations are so major a portion of ASCAP's and BMI's total
revenues, that ASCAP and BMI hardly could afford to withhold
licenses from local stations altogether. (In 1980, for example, BMI's
total revenues were approximately $90 million.'84 More than $20 mil-
lion of the total, or more than 22%, came from local television stations.
In fact, revenues from local stations were more than two-and-a-half
times as great as the $7.8 million BMI collected from the networks that
year. "'85) Therefore, the compromise referred to in Buffalo Broadcast-
ing must have been that local stations agreed to accept blanket licenses
in exchange for ASCAP's and BMI's agreement to accept lesser blanket
fees.
The bilateral monopoly effects of collective bargaining by music
users are portrayed in Figure 1. If ASCAP's and BMI's copyright en-
forcement costs were insignificant, so that their marginal costs were
zero, the music users' countervailing power alone would tend to reduce
the price of blanket licenses below P1 (to perhaps as low as P3) and
increase the quantity of licenses issued above Q I (to perhaps as great as
Q3). ASCAP's and BMI's copyright enforcement costs are not insignif-
icant, however; and therefore their marginal costs are not zero, they are
negative. This being so, the savings that ASCAP and BMI can achieve
by issuing more blanket licenses gives music users additional power on
top of the power they realize from collective bargaining. And thus it
appears that the balance of bargaining power rests with organized mu-
sic users, not with ASCAP and BMI, even though ASCAP and BMI are
"'monopolies" in the non-technical sense of that word.
3. The Economic Impact of the ASCAP Consent Decree
The 1950 amendment to the ASCAP Consent Decree added a pro-
vision which further restricts whatever monopoly bargaining power
ASCAP otherwise might have had. The provision permits music users
to apply to the Federal District Court in New York City for an order
determining a "reasonable" license fee, if agreement on such fees is not
reached with ASCAP directly.' 86 In K-91, Inc. v. Gershwin Publishing
183. Buffalo Broadcasting v. ASCAP, supra note 31, at 288.
184. BMI v. Moor-Law, Inc., supra note 16, at 761.
185. Buffalo Broadcasting v. ASCAP, supra note 31, at 282 n.19.
186. US v. ASCAP, supra note 24, at 63,754.
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Corp., the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that because of
this provision of the Consent Decree, "ASCAP cannot be accused of
fixing prices because.. . it is not the price fixing authority."'' 87 Years
later, in CBS v. ASCAP, the network sought to avoid the K-91 ruling
on this issue by arguing that "a 'reasonable' price fixed by a judge
under the decree, however objectively determined, is not the equivalent
of a price determined in the market place."'8 8 The Court of Appeals
was persuaded by this argument. In its first decision, the Court of Ap-
peals concluded that "a price fixed by a judge, no matter what his per-
sonal competence, is not a true reflection of competitive market forces.
The price, no matter how reasonable, if determined on the imprimatur
of a court, remains the product of non-competitive forces."'8 9 There i.
a flaw in this reasoning, however. The flaw is that due to the unique
nature of music, the price for performance rights can never be a "true
reflection of competitive market forces." Such forces do not work nor-
mally in the music industry."9
In any event, although the Consent Decree does not provide a
mechanism for judicial determination of a truly competitive price, the
Consent Decree does significantly enhance the countervailing power of
music users in their negotiations with ASCAP. It may be expensive for
music users to resort to court for a determination of a reasonable fee,
but it is equally expensive for ASCAP. Furthermor other aspects of
the proceeding favor music users. For example, the Consent Decree
imposes the burden on ASCAP of proving that the fee it has requested
is reasonable.' 9 ' While the proceeding is pending, music users are enti-
tled to a license at a judicially fixed interim fee.' 92 And once a reason-
able fee is fixed, ASCAP is required to offer licenses at a comparable
fee to all other similarly situated music users.' 93 (The BMI Consent
Decree does not contain a similar provision for the judicial determina-
tion of reasonable fees. 194 Nevertheless, historically, BMI's and AS-
CAP's fees have been proportional to one another.1 9 And thus the
judicial determination of an ASCAP fee would be likely to have an
effect on BMI's fees as well.)
187. 372 F.2d at 4.
188. 337 F. Supp. at 397 n.2.
189. 562 F.2d at 139.
190. See supra text accompanying notes 159-166.
191. US v. ASCAP, supra note 24, at 63,754.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. US v. BMI, spra note 25.
195. CBS v. ASCAP, supra note 8, at 753.
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4. Conclusion
Because copyright enforcement expenses necessarily influence the
setting of license fees, because music users who bargain collectively en-
joy countervailing power, and because music users can ask the court to
determine a "reasonable" fee if agreement is not reached, ASCAP and
BMI are unable to exercise whatever monopoly power they otherwise
might have had. Indeed, it appears likely that the balance of bargain-
ing power actually favors music users in their negotiations over blanket
license fees.
C. The Economics of Per Composition Licensing
The Supreme Court has recognized that a blanket license is a dis-
tinct product from licenses to perform individual musical composi-
tions."' For this reason, the Supreme Court has said that blanket
licensing does not violate the antitrust laws merely because blanket li-
cense fees do not vary with the amount, quality or value of the music
actually used. 9 7 Nevertheless, it may be argued that an economic
analysis of blanket licensing does not respond to music users' com-
plaints that they would prefer not to have to take blanket licenses.
Therefore, the argument might proceed, Figure l's demand curve for
blanket licenses plots music users' willingness to buy something they
would not buy at all if they could buy what they do want, namely,
individual, per composition (or per use) licenses. Thus, it may be ar-
gued that in order to assess the true economic consequences of blanket
licensing, the economics of per composition licensing must be consid-
ered and compared to those of blanket licensing. Figure 2 does so.
The vertical axis of Figure 2 measures the Price per composition
for a license to perform musical compositions. The horizontal axis
measures the number of compositions for which licenses are issued.
The Normal Demand Curve for per composition licenses slopes down-
ward and to the right, indicating that as the price per composition de-
creases, music users will take licenses to more compositions. The
Marginal Revenue Curve represents the additional revenue received
from the issuance of a license for one additional composition, assuming
the total number of compositions for which licenses are issued is indi-
cated by the horizontal axis and that the price per composition is indi-
cated by the vertical axis. The Marginal Revenue Curve slopes
196. BMI v. CBS, supra note 7, at 21-22.
197. Id.
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downward and to the right, because in order to sell more licenses for
more compositions, the price charged for all must be reduced; and thus,
as more are sold, the additional (or "marginal") revenue received from
the sale of each additional per composition license decreases.'
The Marginal Cost Curve in Figure 2 is shown to be zero at all
quantities, because it costs nothing to issue an additional license to per-
form existing music.'" (Where per composition - as distinguished
from blanket - licenses are concerned, marginal costs are not negative.
Nothing is saved by issuing an additional per composition license, be-
cause copyright monitoring and enforcement expenses remain the same
unless licenses for all available compositions are taken. That is, if a
music user licenses only some of the songs in a repertory, that user
must be monitored to be certain it does not use any unlicensed songs;
198. The economic characteristics of Figure 2's Normal Demand Curve for per composi-
tion licenses and Marginal Revenue Curve are the same as the characteristics of Figure I's
Demand Curve and Marginal Revenue Curve discussed in the text accompanying notes 168
through 17 1, supra.
199. See supra authorities cited in note 174.
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and the cost of doing that monitoring will be no less than if that user
had no license at all.200)
If ASCAP and BMI (or any other organization) were to be the
exclusive issuer of per composition licenses, and if music users were to
bargain separately and thus have no countervailing power, ASCAP and
BMI would maximize profits by issuing licenses to Q1 compositions,
because at this quantity Marginal Revenue is equal to Marginal
Cost.20 1 If Q1 were the quantity of per composition licenses issued, the
Normal Demand Curve indicates that music users would pay Price P1
to license each composition. At the other extreme, if music users were
to have monopsony power (as do the networks, and as do those users
who bargain collectively), and if individual composers and publishers
were to compete with one another when issuing per composition
licenses, music users would be able to induce the issuance of Q2
licenses, because at this quantity, Normal Demand is equal to Marginal
Cost.20 2 At quantity Q2, Price would be P2 (which theoretically would
be zero).
In effect, a blanket license is one which requires music users to
take licenses for all of the songs in a repertory. It therefore has been
described by Professor John Cirace as an "all-or-nothing bargain,-
20 3
because music users who take a blanket license get a license for all
songs while those who do not get nothing. According to Professor
Cirace, the "all-or-nothing" nature of blanket licensing enables AS-
CAP and BMI to select both the quantity of compositions for which
licenses are issued and the price charged for each composition, even
though music users have substantial monopsony power themselves. 2°
The reason Cirace contends that blanket licensing gives ASCAP and
BMI this tremendous power is illustrated in Figure 3.
Figure 3 is identical to Figure 2 except that two additional demand
curves are portrayed - All-or-Nothing Demand Curves #1 and #2.
The Normal Demand Curve plots the amount that music users would
be willing to pay for a license for each composition assuming they
could buy licenses for any number of fewer compositions at a higher
price per composition. 20 ' An All-or-Nothing Demand Curve measures
200. BMI v. Moor-Law, Inc., supra note 16, at 768.
201. See supra text accompanying note 176; Cirace, supra note 12, at 283.
202. Cirace, supra note 12, at 283-84.
203. Id. at 285.
204. Id.
205. M. Friedman, Price Theory 15 (2d ed. 1976).
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something else entirely: it plots the amount music users would be will-
ing to pay per composition assuming they could not buy licenses for
fewer compositions - that is, assuming that unless they buy licenses
for all the songs in the repertory, they would be unable to obtain
206licenses for any.
Cirace has concluded that the all-or-nothing nature of blanket li-
censing requires music users to buy more music than they want at a
price that is greater than they want to pay. In fact, he says, the blanket
license enables ASCAP and BMI to charge the monopoly price per
composition (P 1) for the number of compositions that would have been
issued (Q2) if music users had all of the bargaining power and ASCAP
and BMI none.2"7 It appears, however, that Professor Cirace overstates
the effects of blanket licensing on ASCAP's and BMI's bargaining
power. This is so for two reasons.
First, the amount that music users are willing to pay for blanket
licenses determines the position of the All-or-Nothing Demand Curve.
The All-or-Nothing Demand Curve shifts farther to the right the more
music users are willing to pay. All-or-Nothing Demand Curve # 1 in
Figure 3 is positioned precisely where Cirace positioned it in his analy-
sis.2"8 This position, however, is as far to the right as an All-or-Noth-
ing Demand Curve ever gets. And it gets this far to the right only when
206. Id.
207. Cirace, supra note 12, at 285-86.
208. Id. at 285, Figure 2.
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the total amount spent by buyers for the product in question is so small
that the marginal utility of the last dollars spent for it is not affected.2°9
This happens only when its cost is so small in relation to the total cost
of the thing in which the product is to be used that the demand for the
product is inelastic.210 For example, a gourmet restaurant's demand
for salt is inelastic, because its cost is very small in relation to the total
cost of everything that goes into operating a gourmet restaurant.2 '
However, if the total amount spent for the product is great enough that
marginal utility is affected, then the All-or-Nothing Demand Curve
does not shift as far to the right.212 It may shift only as far as All-or-
Nothing Demand Curve #2. This is critical, because the price in-
creases as the All-or-Nothing Demand Curve shifts to the right; and the
less it shifts, the less the price increases.
In the music business, this means that the demand for blanket
licenses is reflected by All-or-Nothing Demand Curve #1 only if the
price of blanket licenses is so small in relation to the cost of the produc-
tion in which the music is used that the marginal utility of the money
spent on blanket licenses is not affected and the demand for blanket
licenses is inelastic. If the price of blanket licenses is great enough to
affect marginal utility and the elasticity of demand, then the demand
curve for blanket licenses is not as far to the right as All-or-Nothing
Demand Curve #1. If the demand curve for blanket licenses is only as
far to the right as All-or-Nothing Demand Curve #2, the price of Q2
compositions will be less than P 1. If the cost of blanket licenses is great
enough in relation to the total cost of the production in which the music
is used, the All-or-Nothing Demand Curve would coincide with the
Normal Demand Curve. In that instance, music users would be indif-
ferent between blanket and per composition licenses.
The second and even more significant reason Cirace overstates the
effect of blanket licensing on ASCAP's and BMI's bargaining power is
that he apparently concluded that blanket licensing deprives monop-
sony buyers of their bargaining power to reduce prices. In his analysis,
a blanket license seems to consist of the right to perform Q2 composi-
tions. If blanket licenses did consist of Q2 compositions, then the price
per composition would increase as the demand curve shifted to the
right, as Cirace indicated.2" 3 However, although the all-or-nothing
209. M. Friedman, supra note 205, at 15 n.l.
210. Cirace, supra note 12, at 285 n.50; P. Samuelson, supra note 159, at 411.
211. P. Samuelson, supra note 159, at 411.
212. M. Friedman, supra note 205, at 15 n.1.
213. Cirace, supra note 12, at 285, Figure 2.
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character of blanket licensing may shift the demand curve for music to
the right, it does not deprive monopsony buyers of their bargaining
power to reduce the price towards the competitive price P2. The reason
that it does not is that there is no reason to assume that there are Q2
compositions in ASCAP's and BMI's repertories. There are more than
three million compositions in the ASCAP repertory and approximately
one million in BMI's. 214 Music users contend that the) neither want
nor need licenses to this many compositions; 215 indeed, NBC once said
that it would be satisfied with licenses to 2,217 compositions."1 It
therefore appears that Q2 compositions is far fewer than the number in
a blanket license. It is likely that the number of compositions in a blan-
ket license is closer to Q3 (and maybe even greater than that). For this
reason, monopsony buyers have the bargaining power to obtain blan-
ket license fees of less than P1. If there are Q3 compositions in a blan-
ket license, buyers even have the power to bargain the price down to
P2.
For both of these reasons, blanket licensing does not give ASCAP
and BMI the bargaining power to set monopoly prices when they deal
with monopsony buyers including the networks and local television
stations.
VII. THE ECONOMIC CASE FOR RETAINING BLANKET LICENSING
There are at least four economic reasons for retaining the use of
blanket licensing.
First, blanket licensing is the only means (short of unionization)
composers have to offset the monopsony buying power of networks and
local television stations. Professor Cirace himself found this to be so
(at least in the case of network television).2" 7 In fact, he concluded that
"[n]o system short of blanket licensing will adequately offset the mo-
nopsony power of network television"2 ' (and presumably other mo-
nopsony buyers as well).
Second, per composition licenses would result in greater transac-
tion costs than are incurred with blanket licenses. It is the case that
synchronization licenses are issued on a per composition basis;219 and
214. Buffalo Broadcasting v. ASCAP, supra note 31, at 277.
215. See, e.g., BMI v. Moor-Law, Inc., supra note 16, at 767.
216. US v. ASCAP (Application of National Broadcasting Co., Inc.), supra note 70, at
90,008.
217. Cirace, supra note 12, at 293.
218. Id. at 297.
219. See supra text accompanying notes 48 through 50.
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therefore the number of transactions would not increase if performance
licenses were issued at the same time as synch licenses. However, at the
present time, synch license transactions involve very little money.
Synch rights for a television program may sell for only $50 to $500 per
composition, as compared to synch-and-performance rights for theatri-
cal motion pictures which cost $750 to $20,000 per composition.220
Composers and publishers treat television synch licenses as "loss lead-
ers" in order to induce producers to use their compositions, because
more and greater earnings follow in the form of performance fees paid
by the networks and local stations to ASCAP and BMI. However, if
performance fees were no longer collected by ASCAP and BMI, but
rather were agreed to at the outset when synch licenses are issued, those
initial negotiations would take on a financial significance they do not
have at present. Thus, it may be expected that much more time and
effort - and thus expense - would go into those negotiations.
Third, per composition licensing would result in substantially
greater copyright enforcement costs. At the present time, monitoring
and enforcement is done by ASCAP and BMI, and they deduct the
costs of doing so prior to distributing the balance among composers
and publishers.22' Monitoring and enforcement by individual compos-
ers and publishers would be much more expensive,222 because all of the
economies of scale now realized by ASCAP and BMI would be lost.
The Justice Department itself has recognized that it would be "impossi-
ble" for composers and publishers to enforce their rights under the
Copyright Act on an individual basis.223 Furthermore, monitoring and
enforcement expenses would increase even if composers and publishers
hired ASCAP and BMI to perform monitoring and enforcement serv-
ices centrally. This is so because blanket licensing eliminates the need
to monitor licensees. If per composition licenses were used, however,
all music users would have to be monitored to be certain that they do
not use compositions for which they do not have licenses. 24 Computer
technology would be of little or no help in monitoring, even if done
centrally, because many songs have identical titles. For example, BMI
has more than 30 songs in its repertory entitled "Rose Colored
Glasses"; but in 1981, the most popular song with that title was in the
ASCAP repertory. Thus in order to monitor local television stations by.
220. Buffalo Broadcasting v. ASCAP, supra note 31, at 283 n.20; Cirace, supra note 12, at
295 n.114.
221. BMI v. Moor-Law, Inc., supra note 16, at 761-62.
222. BMI v. CBS, supra note 7, at 20.
223. See supra note 7.
224. BMI v. Moor-Law, Inc., supra note 16, at 768 n.13, 770.
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checking computerized editions of TV Guide against cue sheets and
lists of BMI and ASCAP songs, it would be necessary to have cue
sheets which accurately list composers' names as well as song titles.225
Finally, per composition licensing is not necessary to assure com-
petition among composers and publishers, because blanket licensing
does not eliminate all such competition. Although composers and pub-
lishers of pre-existing music do not price compete in the licensing of
performance rights, they do compete in promoting their music. 226 Even
with respect to price, blanket licensing does not "insulate" composers
and publishers from competition among themselves. They price com-
pete when issuing synchronization licenses. Moreover, television pro-
ducers are able to price compete among themselves when setting
license fees for their programs as a whole; and thus, to the extent music
publishers are owned by producers, publishers compete among them-
selves as well.
VIII. THE ROLE OF ECONOMIC THEORY IN THE INTERPRETATION
OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS
Antitrust law is designed to control the exercise of private eco-
nomic power.227 It is therefore not surprising that an understanding of
antitrust law requires "an appreciation of the structure of the American
economy and some acquaintance with economic theory. ' 228 There are
those who have endorsed economics as a unifying theory for much
more than antitrust law.229 However, it may be wise to remain skepti-
cal of the value of the "dismal science" even in the proper interpreta-
tion of antitrust.
The use of economics in the solution of legal problems presents
several problems. As Professor Phillip Areeda has pointed out, "eco-
nomics. . . provides few clear-cut answers. We are not always able to
determine the economic results of the particular practice or market
structure under examination. Nor can we always predict the conse-
quences of prohibiting some particular behavior. 230 In addition, there
is another factor which "limits the utility of economics'2 in the inter-
pretation of law, namely, the uneven capacity of the bench and bar to
225. Id. at 770.
226. CBS v. ASCAP, supra note 8, at 770.
227. E. Gellhorn, upra note 160, at 1; P. Areeda, Antitrust Analysis 5 (3d ed. 1981).
228. P. Areeda, supra note 227, at 6.
229. See, e.g., R. Posner, Economic Anlaysis of Law (2d ed. 1977); A.M. Polinsky, An
Introduction to Law and Economics (1983).
230. P. Areeda, supra note 227, at 6.
231. L. Sullivan, supra note 159, at 7.
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evaluate economic data and properly manipulate economic theory.2 32
Judges and lawyers are trained to administer rules of law. Predictabil-
ity is an important value in the administration of justice. Indeed, at a
recent workshop on the role of economic theory in antitrust enforce-
ment, Federal Circuit Judge Stephen Breyer said that "law is aimed at
justice, not truth. '2 33 If every judge were free to apply his or her own
economic views, it would be impossible for business executives to know
in advance whether contemplated conduct is legal or apt to result in
treble damage judgments.
The Buffalo Broadcasting"' case seems to illustrate perfectly the
unpredictability that results when economic theory, rather than legal
doctrine, becomes the basis for decision. Is there a rule of law that
permits blanket licensing of television networks and locally produced
programming (as well as radio stations, nightclubs, and hotels) but
makes blanket licensing of syndicated television programming (includ-
ing off-network reruns) an illegal restraint of trade? Even if the District
Court's economic analysis in Buffalo Broadcasting were correct, the
case makes an overly fine distinction - a distinction which could not
have been predicted. Indeed, in the CBS case, the Supreme Court it-
self noted that "the necessity for and advantages of a blanket license
for [television networks] may be far less obvious than is the case when
the potential users are individual television . . . stations."23 Thus in
Buffalo Broadcasting, the court relied on economic analysis to conclude
that blanket licensing is illegal in an area - local television - where
the need for and advantages of blanket licensing are more obvious than
they are in another area - network television - where blanket licens-
ing is legal. When economic analysis leads to a conclusion such as this,
the analysis has little if any value.
232. See L. Sullivan, supra note 159, at 7.
233. Lewin, What's the Role of Economic Theory in Antitrust Rulings?, L.A. Daily J.,
March 11, 1983, at Sec. I, p.4.
234. Buffalo Broadcasting Company, Inc. v. ASCAP, supra note 31.
235. BMI v. CBS, supra note 7, at 21.
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